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What Is Standard Tomorrow, May Not
Have Been Today: An Argument For
Claiming Scènes à Faire
LOGAN SANDLER *
Recent lawsuits involving the Pirates of the Caribbean
film franchise and the Oscar award-winning movie The
Shape of Water required courts to wrestle with the application of the decisive scènes à faire doctrine. In doing so, the
Ninth Circuit exposed the doctrine’s chief pitfall: the lack of
a temporal framework.
The modern scènes à faire doctrine limits the scope of
what authors can claim as substantially similar by excluding
the standard or stock elements in a given expressive work
from copyright protection. Courts will often conclude that a
contested element is scènes à faire if it can be demonstrated
that certain themes, events, or settings in question belong to
a certain genre. To measure what may fall within the scope
of unprotected stock, a court focuses on supplementary factors such as the public’s perception of genre conventions,
which are culturally dependent and drastically evolve over
time.
However, many courts fail to consider “timing” when
applying the scènes à faire doctrine. Courts do not necessarily evaluate whether certain aspects or elements within a
work were “standard or stock” when the copyrighted material was created. For that reason, an infringing work that
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becomes popular may use the scènes à faire doctrine as a
sword against what was once original singular expression.
This inequitable scenario could arise if the scènes à faire
doctrine is applied to a work at the commencement of litigation and not at the time of the work’s original drafting.
In reasoning that courts should focus a scènes à faire
inquiry from the perspective of the writer at the time that the
copyrighted material was written, this Comment explores
the claiming systems of patent law with a view toward how
they may remedy the scènes à faire doctrine’s shortcomings.
To rectify the doctrine’s inadequacies, primarily within the
context of screenplays and teleplays, this Comment ultimately proposes an author-drafted copyright registration
supplement that details the intricacies of how a genre’s conventions were implemented in a work at the time of creation
through plot, character, theme, and setting, among other
things.
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INTRODUCTION
[I]n Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there
is only rarely anything new under the sun.
—Judge Joseph T. Sneed III 1
On July 22, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
resuscitated a copyright infringement claim brought by two screenwriters who alleged that the Walt Disney Company copied their pirate-themed screenplay to create the first Pirates of the Caribbean
1

Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985).
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film. 2 Previously, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California found that much of the works’ similarities
were unprotectable scènes à faire elements because the resemblances were “familiar stock scenes, and characteristics that flow
naturally from the works’ shared basic plot premise” within the pirate genre. 3 In support of its reversal and remand, the appellate panel
found that the district court prematurely determined that the shared
elements amidst the two works were unprotectable scènes à faire
common to pirate stories. 4 Under the scènes à faire doctrine, courts
will not protect elements like stock characters or standard elements
for the genre of the work in question. 5
Because the work in question was approximately twenty years
old and the “Pirates of the Caribbean film franchise may itself have
shaped what are now considered pirate-movie tropes,” 6 an important
question arises: at what point in time should courts apply the scènes
à faire doctrine? 7 At the time of the work’s creation, at the moment
of alleged infringement, or at the time of the suit’s commencement?
If the scènes à faire doctrine is applied to the literary work at the
time of litigation and not at the time of the work’s original drafting,
a copyrighted work could lose its value and protection upon a potentially infringing work becoming “successful and widely
adopted.” 8 To be sure, the Ninth Circuit’s decision provides little
See Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. App’x 727 (9th Cir. 2020). On September 7, 2021, Defendant Walt Disney Pictures filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment. See Defendant Walt Disney Pictures’ Notice of Motion and Motion for
Summary Judgment Re Substantial Similarity, Alfred, II et al. v. Walt Disney
Pictures, No. 2:18-CV-08074-CBM-Asx (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2021). At the time of
this Comment’s publication, Judge Consuelo B. Marshall had yet to issue a final
decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
3
See Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1183 (C.D. Cal.
2019).
4
See Alfred, 821 F. App’x at 729 (indicating that at the pleading stage of
litigation, “it is difficult to know whether such elements are indeed unprotectible
material” and that “[a]dditional evidence would help inform the question of substantial similarity”).
5
See id.
6
Id.
7
See Dale Cendali, Litigating Scènes À Faire, 43 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 415,
418 (2020).
8
Krista S. Schwartz et al., Software and Scènes à Faire, COPYRIGHT WORLD
11, 12 (2009).
2
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direction to district courts in adjudicating future infringement claims
where temporal issues of such significance may arise.
Although a screenwriter may justifiably conclude that their
screenplay or teleplay has been pilfered, proving this belief in a
court of law can be an arduous and costly endeavor. 9 As a threshold
matter, copyright law solely protects the “expression of ideas, not
the ideas themselves.” 10 While utterly complete originality may not
necessarily exist, “[t]his distinction [between protected expressions
and unprotected ideas] is at the essence” of many copyright infringement claims. 11
To prove copyright infringement, screenwriters must prove that
they had copyright ownership and that the alleged infringer had access to the work, while additionally demonstrating substantial similarity between the two screenplays. 12 Typically, such copyright infringement actions end with a pretrial ruling maintaining that the
litigant-writer failed to show substantial similarity as a matter of
law. 13 For this reason, the “meat and potatoes” of screenplay litigation is substantial similarity. 14 Enveloped within the determination
of substantial similarity is the scènes à faire doctrine, which is understood to be one of the chief barriers that a writer-turned-plaintiff
faces when attempting to demonstrate substantial similarity between
works. 15
The modern scènes à faire doctrine limits the scope of what authors may claim by excluding the standard or stock elements in a
given expressive work from copyright protection. 16 Correspondingly, the doctrine precludes stock and standard elements, standing
Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin’ Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare; Copyright Infringement and the Motion Picture Screenplay: Toward an
Improved Framework, 10 UNIV. GA. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 359, 360 (2003).
10
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Familiar stock scenes and themes that are staples of literature are not protected.”).
11
Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 10 PACE L. REV. 551, 552 (1990).
12
See Gladden, supra note 9, at 360.
13
Robert F. Helfing, Substantial Similarity in Literary Infringement Cases:
A Chart for Turbid Waters, 21 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014).
14
Gladden, supra note 9, at 360.
15
Id. at 375.
16
Robert Kirk Walker, Breaking with Convention: The Conceptual Failings
of Scenes A Faire, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 435, 436 (2020).
9

382

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

alone, from successfully supporting a copyright infringement
claim. 17 For instance, the average audience member likely expects
that at the conclusion of a Hollywood detective film, the identity of
the wrongdoer will be discovered. For all practical purposes, these
necessary scenes or events that are so-called scènes à faire have become unprotectable ideas in their own right by virtue of their indispensable character. 18
Similarly, situations and incidents that flow naturally from a
basic plot idea are rendered scènes à faire and cannot normally sustain an infringement claim. 19 For example, in Williams v. Crichton,
a finding of infringement could not be sustained since “the common
elements of electrified fences, automated tours, dinosaur nurseries,
and uniformed workers were scenes-a-faire that flowed from the
concept of a dinosaur zoo.” 20 Like the merger doctrine and the ideaexpression distinction, courts have yet to develop a surefire test to
differentiate between protectable, original expression and unprotected stock elements and characters; but, unlike the merger doctrine
and the idea-expression distinction, the scènes à faire doctrine has
received minute consideration from legal scholars. 21
What is more—the scènes à faire doctrine shifts a court’s focus
to use ancillary factors such as the public’s perception of genre conventions, 22 which are culturally dependent and drastically evolve
over time, 23 to measure what may fall within the scope of unprotected stock. 24 However, many courts fail to consider “timing” altogether when applying the scènes à faire doctrine. 25 Specifically,
courts do not necessarily evaluate whether certain aspects or
17

Id.
Gavin M. Strube, Comment, Gotham Skylines: The Intersection of Scènes
à Faire and Fictional Facts in Comic Books, Graphic Novels, and their Derivative
Works, 5 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. 54, 64–65 (2015).
19
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293–94 (9th Cir. 1985).
20
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996)).
21
Walker, supra note 16, at 435.
22
Don M. Tamura, Comment, Copyright Infringement: An Argument for the
Elimination of the Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 5 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 147,
161 (1982).
23
Walker, supra note 16, at 438.
24
See id. at 457.
25
See, e.g., Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (C.D. Cal.
2019).
18
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elements within a screenplay or teleplay were “standard or stock”
when the copyrighted material was written. 26 As explained further
herein, 27 the lack of a consistent temporal framework not only frustrates the incentives for creating original works, but also results in
misunderstanding and repeated misapplication of the scènes à faire
doctrine in literary copyright infringement cases. 28 The Supreme
Court has concluded that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality,” and “[t]o qualify for copyright protection, a work must be
original to the author.” 29 To be consistent with this tenet, a court’s
scènes à faire inquiry must examine the “originality” of a screenplay
or teleplay at the time of the work’s creation because gauging originality necessitates an accurate perspective of the creator at the moment of creation—not at a construed moment in the past or future. 30
A similar quandary to the circumstances in Alfred v. Walt Disney
Co. presented itself in a lawsuit concerning the Academy Awardwinning film The Shape of Water. There, the estate of Paul Zindel
alleged that Director Guillermo del Toro plagiarized Paul Zindel’s
1969 play Let Me Hear You Whisper. 31 Both The Shape of Water
and Zindel’s play concerned plots centered on an aquatic creature
imprisoned in a science research laboratory. In June 2020, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the “district court
erred by dismissing the action because, at this stage, reasonable
minds could differ on whether there is substantial similarity between
Let Me Hear You Whisper and The Shape of Water.” 32 Notably, the
opinion provided that further evidence would “illuminate whether
any similarities are mere unprotectable literary tropes or scènes à

See also Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12 (“The absence of an analytical
framework including a logical temporal component has resulted in confusion and
frequent misapplication of the scènes à faire doctrine in computer software copyright cases.”).
27
See infra Part III.
28
See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12.
29
Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
30
Cf. Cendali, supra note 7, at 418.
31
Plaintiff-Appellant David Zindel’s Opening Brief, at 2 Zindel v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-56087), 2018
WL 6681697, at *1.
32
Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158, 160 (9th Cir.
2020).
26
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faire.” 33 Earlier, in 2018, the district court dismissed the case, finding any similarities among the works “too general to be protected.”34
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not indicate if it would be
proper to evaluate whether the similarities found in Let Me Hear You
Whisper were standard, stock, or common at the time when Zindel
authored the play. Because the play was written roughly fifty-one
years ago, an accurate and equitable scènes à faire analysis of the
alleged similarities should look to what was generalized stock
within this subject at the time of creation in 1969. On April 2, 2021,
after more than three years of litigation, the parties stipulated that
the action be dismissed with prejudice. 35 The matter was set for a
July 2021 trial date. 36 Although Zindel’s estate purportedly agreed
to dismiss the case, the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Zindel v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. and Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. confirm not
only the significance of the scènes à faire doctrine for plaintiffs attempting to prove improper infringement, but also that the doctrine’s
temporal framework must be reformed.
Though some argue that the scènes à faire doctrine should be
eliminated altogether, 37 this Comment proposes that an improved
copyright registration system can more adequately and successfully
guide courts through the necessary measure of the scènes à faire
doctrine. With the goal of decreasing frivolous or lengthy litigation,
while protecting expression through evidentiary assurance, this
Comment will demonstrate that copyright law can be reasonably
tweaked by adding supportive claiming elements reminiscent of patent law to clarify the author’s inspiration, intention, and understanding of a given genre as it relates to the plot, theme, mood, setting, pace, and characters in his or her work. 38 To that end, this Comment will also maintain that to ascertain whether the scènes à faire
33

Id.
Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. CV18-1435 PA (KSx), 2018
WL 3601842, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2018).
35
Stipulation For Dismissal with Prejudice at 2–3, Zindel, 815 F. App’x 158
(No. 2:18-CV-01435-PA-KS).
36
Zach Sharf, ‘Shape of Water’ Plagiarism Lawsuit Dismissed: Guillermo
del Toro Is the ‘True Creator’, INDIEWIRE (Apr. 5, 2021, 11:45 AM), https:/
/www.indiewire.com/2021/04/shape-of-water-plagiarism-lawsuit-dismissedguillermo-del-toro-1234627996/.
37
See, e.g., Tamura, supra note 22, at 149.
38
See infra Part V.
34
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doctrine precludes copyright protection for a literary work and a dramatic work, courts should assess the debated material from two angles: (1) from the point of view of the author of the copyrighted material and (2) based on other widely known works existing at the
time the copyrighted work was created or written. 39 This assessment
not only advances both the policy and economic aims of copyright
protection, but also requires courts to examine the originality of the
author’s work against the prevailing genre tropes existing when the
work was written. 40
Part II succinctly outlines the necessary elements of an action
for copyright infringement and what a plaintiff must prove in order
to prevail. In addition, Part II will illustrate how U.S. courts today
apply the scènes à faire doctrine. Part III discusses the deficiencies
inherent in the scènes à faire doctrine in light of the circumstances
in Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. Part III also assesses the potential implications of a scènes à faire analysis that evaluates whether the disputed work was original or whether it was standard or stock when
the author, namely screenwriters, penned the screenplay or teleplay.
Part IV explores the modern claiming systems of U.S. patent law
and examines its underlying policies as a means of ascertaining their
applicability for copyrighting literary and dramatic works, primarily
through the lens of screenplays and teleplays, as these kinds of
works are the fictional forms where the scenes à faire doctrine is
most commonly invoked. 41 Part V resolves said issues, in part by
utilizing patent law claiming systems and applying it to the scènes à
faire doctrine’s shortcomings. In doing so, this Comment will
demonstrate how the proposed claiming framework will aide a
court’s application of the substantial similarity test—a test that has
evolved to “create[] a confusing and ineffectual body of law . . . .” 42
Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12 (establishing parallel test in the context
of computer software copyright infringement cases).
40
See id. (“[T]he purpose of the Copyright Clause is to reward an author’s
original creation.”).
41
See generally Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of
the Scenes a Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
779 (2006); Torrean Edwards, Scènes à Faire in Music: How an Old Defense is
Maturing, and How it Can Be Improved, 23 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 105,
108 (2019) (indicating that the scènes à faire doctrine was “traditionally reserved
for literature, stage works, and later film . . . ”).
42
Helfing, supra note 13, at 3.
39
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Finally, the Conclusion will offer closing thoughts regarding the future of screenplay and teleplay litigation, while dually suggesting
what writers can do to protect themselves in the immediate future.
II.

CONNECTING PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT TO
THE SCÈNES À FAIRE DOCTRINE

A.
Copyright Infringement
Copyright protection is intended to stimulate creativity and the
distribution of creative works so that society may benefit from the
efforts of authors. 43 The major policy purpose underlying the copyright system is the belief “that if protection were absent, then unauthorized reproduction would impair the economic interest of the author and curtail creation of new works.” 44 And so, copyright law
incentivizes authors to create new works by giving authors “the exclusive right to profit from and control specified uses of their
works.” 45 For our purposes, a motion picture screenplay, teleplay,
or novel is a “writing” within the import of the Copyright Clause. 46
Since direct evidence of copying rarely exists, 47 courts will “infer” copying when a plaintiff shows that the alleged infringer had
access to the plaintiff’s work and created a product that was substantially similar to that work. 48 In addition to these two requirements,
copyright ownership for that work must be proved; however, this
element is a “statutory formality easily satisfied prior to the

43
Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes A Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV.
79, 83 (1989).
44
Tamura, supra note 22, at 149.
45
Kurtz, supra note 43, at 83; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing the set of
exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
46
See Gladden, supra note 9, at 361; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47
Edwards, supra note 41, at 105.
48
Steven G. McKnight, Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An Old
Copyright Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (1983).

2021]

AN ARGUMENT FOR CLAIMING SCÈNES À FAIRE

387

institution of litigation.”49 As previously mentioned, substantial
similarity is often the crucial issue in copyright infringement litigation. 50
To determine whether works are indeed substantially similar,
courts tackle two main types of analysis. First, courts must demarcate the scope of a plaintiff’s copyright to establish what a defendant
may or may not copy. 51 Second, courts must weigh the defendant’s
work against the plaintiff’s protectable expression to determine
whether they are substantially similar. 52
Vital to the initial determination of scope is the idea-expression
distinction, which provides “that copyright laws protect only expressions of ideas, not the abstract ideas underlying a copyrighted
work.” 53 The expression of a creative work is therefore the only
facet subject to monopoly control, whereas “‘ideas’ may always be
freely borrowed.” 54 In other words, copyright law “protects originality in the means of expression.” 55 This principle consequently
“depends upon the distinguishability of the idea from its expression.” 56 While the line separating idea and expression is not welldefined, 57 strong trends have materialized within the screenplay and
teleplay context regarding what constitutes substantial similarity,
predominantly within the elements of character, plot, mood, and
Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An Improved
Approach for Determining Substantial Similarity, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 277, 277
(1993); see also 17 U.S.C. § 411 (setting forth the statutory requirement that registration must be made before an action for copyright infringement is initiated).
50
See, e.g., Smith v. AMC Networks, Inc., No. 18-CV-03803-LHK, 2019
WL402360, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019) (“Analysis of . . . ‘substantial similarity’ between the works—is the crux of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”).
51
McKnight, supra note 48, at 1280.
52
See generally Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir.
2001) (“The standard test for substantial similarity between two items is whether
an ‘ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed
to overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal as the same.’”). E.g., Williams
v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996) (demonstrating that in the “novel and
movie” context courts “examine the similarities in such aspects as the total concept and feel, theme, characters, plot, sequence, pace, and setting . . . “)
53
McKnight, supra note 48, at 1280.
54
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 612 (2d. Cir 1945).
55
Leon R. Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas—A Judge’s Approach, 43
VA. L. REV. 375, 378 (1957).
56
McKnight, supra note 48, at 1281.
57
Gladden, supra note 9, at 362.
49
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theme. 58 With regards to television and film scripts, general concepts and ideas associated with these elements are uncopyrightable,
but the particular expression of those ideas is copyrightable. 59 For
example, in Berkic v. Crichton, the Ninth Circuit rejected finding
substantial similarity based on familiar stocks scenes such as “depictions of the small miseries of domestic life, romantic frolics at
the beach, and conflicts between ambitious young people on one
hand, and conservative or evil bureaucracies on the other.” 60
In the Ninth Circuit, courts often employ the Krofft “extrinsicintrinsic” filtration test to facilitate an accurate sorting of protectable
and unprotectable elements. 61 The intrinsic test, which scrutinizes
“an ordinary person’s subjective impressions of the similarities between two works[,]” is exclusively the jury’s domain. 62 The extrinsic test, employed by courts at the motion to dismiss and summary
judgement stage, is “objective in nature” and “focuses on ‘articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting,
pace, characters, and sequence of events.’” 63 When employing the
extrinsic test, courts “must filter out and disregard the non-protectible elements in making its substantial similarity determination.” 64
When the plaintiff’s argument is based on the overall selection
and sequencing of unprotectable similarities, the presence of many
scènes à faire elements may satisfy a court’s application of the extrinsic test. 65 In implementing what is known as the “selection and
arrangement test,” the Ninth Circuit has equally specified that “[i]t
is entirely immaterial that, in many respects, plaintiff’s and defendant’s works are dissimilar, if in other respects, similarity as to a

Id. at 366.
See id. at 371.
60
See 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (“These familiar scenes and
themes are among the very staples of modern American literature and film.”).
61
Gladden, supra note 9, at 366.
62
Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir.
2006).
63
Id.
64
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Scenes-a-faire, or situations and incidents that flow necessarily or naturally
from a basic plot premise, cannot sustain a finding of infringement.”).
65
Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1060, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002).
58
59
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substantial element of plaintiff’s work can be shown.” 66 Metcalf v.
Bochco offers an informative example of what is necessary for the
selection and arrangement of generic or scènes à faire elements in a
narrative work to establish substantial similarity. 67 The Metcalf
court assessed a claim concerning a treatment 68 entitled Give Something Back and the CBS television series City of Angels. 69 There, the
court described the unprotectable similarities as striking:
Both the Metcalf and Bochco works are set in overburdened county hospitals in inner-city Los Angeles
with mostly black staffs. Both deal with issues of
poverty, race relations and urban blight. The works’
main characters are both young, good-looking, muscular black surgeons who grew up in the neighborhood where the hospital is located. Both surgeons
struggle to choose between the financial benefits of
private practice and the emotional rewards of working in the inner city. Both are romantically involved
with young professional women when they arrive at
the hospital, but develop strong attractions to hospital administrators. Both new relationships flourish
and culminate in a kiss, but are later strained when
the administrator observes a display of physical intimacy between the main character and his original
love interest. Both administrators are in their thirties,
were once married but are now single, without children and devoted to their careers and to the hospital.
In both works, the hospital’s bid for reaccreditation
is vehemently opposed by a Hispanic politician. 70
L.A. Printex Indus. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir.
2012)(citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03 (B)(1)(a) (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2011).
67
Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1075.
68
Jason Hellerman, How to Write a Treatment (with Film Treatment Examples), NO FILM SCHOOL (Oct. 23, 2018), https://nofilmschool.com/film-treatment
(“[A film treatment is a] multi-page document written in prose, that tells the story
that happens in your screenplay. It is a synopsis, with action, sparse dialogue, and
works as a roadmap for the reader, producer, and writer.”).
69
Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1072.
70
Id. at 1073–74.
66
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Beyond merely enumerating generic elements, a plaintiff similarly situated to that of the Metcalf plaintiff must contend that the
works coordinate or arrange the scènes à faire elements in strikingly
similar fashion to satisfy the extrinsic test and avoid dismissal or
summary judgment. 71
B.
Modern Application of the Scènes à Faire Doctrine
As a threshold matter, a litigant will typically present scènes à
faire evidence to the court by affixing it to the pleading or incorporating it through reference therein. 72 Although courts have yet to
squarely define the French term, 73 many courts today have used the
definition set forth in Alexander v. Haley, which provides that
scènes à faire are “incidents, characters or settings which are as a
practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment
of a given topic.” 74 In the literary and cinema context, this analysis
underpins the modern scènes à faire doctrine. 75 And so, after identifying the pertinent distinctions amongst the incidents, characters, or
settings—which may be “very subtle and refined, and, sometimes,
almost evanescent” 76—a court must determine whether a given
characteristic or component is either standard to a given topic or indispensable. 77 A court’s determination of indispensability seeks to
precisely ascertain whether one of the aforesaid elements naturally
flows from a film’s genre or narrative theme or mise-en-scène. 78 If
so, any similarities are thereby inherent in the situation and are thus
unprotectable. 79
The other threshold query asks courts to pursue an understanding of whether characters or standard scenes have acquired a “level
of cultural familiarity that their existence cannot be attributed to the
See id. at 1075.
Cendali, supra note 7, at 416.
73
Kurtz, supra note 43, at 81.
74
460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (emphasis added).
75
See, e.g., Bernal v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency, 788 F. Supp. 2d
1043, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
76
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
77
See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2006).
78
See Kurtz, supra note 43, at 92.
79
Gladden, supra note 9, at 375.
71
72
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creativity of any particular author.” 80 For example, one classic
model “is the lack of [copyright] protection in police fiction for
‘drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict cars’ and ‘foot chases and
the morale problems of policemen, not to mention the familiar figure
of the Irish cop.’” 81 Almost inevitably, these so-termed “standard”
scenes or incidents arise in every genre. 82 It is a general precept of
copyright law that the protection of fictional works will not extend
to stock characters or plots regularly linked to a “particular genre.” 83
In addition, courts will conclude that a contested element is scènes
à faire if it can be demonstrated that certain themes, events, or settings in question belong to a genre. 84 For instance, the genre of science fiction commonly involves unprotectable “‘stock themes,’”
like “space travel, supernatural forces, war games, alien discovery,
and adventuring through space.” 85
Rather vexing is how modern courts apply the scènes à faire doctrine, frequently determining that a given element of a work is unprotected “without the need for explanation or supporting evidence.” 86 Indeed, courts are often apparently “unaware that [a]
scènes à faire [analysis] requires them to answer complex and taxonomic aesthetic questions.” 87 To be sure, the scènes à faire doctrine
demands a detailed “subjective and qualitative assessment[]” 88 of
the work in question. Support for this contention is buttressed by
Smith v. AMC Networks, Inc. There, Judge Lucy Koh discounted the

Walker, supra note 16, at 452.
Gladden, supra note 9, at 375.
82
Kurtz, supra note 43, at 92.
83
See Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“[E]lements of a work that are indispensable, or at least standard in the treatment
of a given topic—like cowboys, bank robbers, and shootouts in stories of the
American West—get no protection.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that “electrified
fences, automated tours, dinosaur nurseries, and uniformed workers” are standard
scènes à faire that derive from the uncopyrightable idea of a dinosaur zoo).
84
Tamura, supra note 22, at 160.
85
See Abdin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 971 F.3d 57, 71 (2d Cir. 2020).
86
Walker, supra note 16, at 456.
87
Id. at 463.
88
See Robert K. Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments
in Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343,
346 (2015).
80
81
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array of cases 89 that the defendants’ argument relied upon because
those cases’ conclusions of scènes à faire elements “offer[ed] little
analysis.” 90
On account of this, courts should aim to thoroughly consider and
ascertain the legitimate creative expressive differences between
works when applying the scènes à faire doctrine, rather than relying
solely on the scènes à faire doctrine as a quick fix exclusionary
checklist. The thoroughness and diligence of a court’s assessment
would be unquestionably bolstered by an author-created informational rubric to guide judges in their analyses. It is the complexity of
this analysis, in part, that drives the heart of this Comment’s forthcoming proposal. 91 As demonstrated infra Part V, this rubric would
permit judges to answer the taxonomic aesthetic questions inherent
in a scènes à faire analysis without having to rely so heavily on their
own aesthetic judgments. 92
Akin to a valid copyright registration affording a plaintiff prima
facie evidence of ownership, 93 adding copyright claiming elements
suggestive of patent law can provide courts with prima facie evidence of a work’s genre. In practice, this would aid courts in conclusively determining not only what genre the work should be classified as, but additionally would, especially for genre-bending
works, assist courts in determining what elements are in fact indispensable or stock when conducting the extrinsic test. Without care
and author guidance, judicial decisions assessing genre and/or historical works under the doctrine may be subject to error or may be
altogether impossible. This is because many filmmakers, like The
Coen Brothers, Paul Thomas Anderson, or Quentin Tarantino, use
easily recognizable visual and textual references—i.e., stock
See, e.g., Cline v. Reetz-Laoilo, 329 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1015 (N.D. Cal.
2018); Heusey v. Emmerich, CV 14-06810-AB (Ex), 2015 WL 12765115, at *1
(C.D. Cal. April 9, 2015); DuckHole Inc. v. NBC Universal Media LLC, No. CV
12–10077 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 5797279, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013).
90
Smith v. AMC Networks, Inc., No. 18-CV-03803-LHK, 2019 WL 402360,
at *6 (N.D Cal. Jan. 31, 2019).
91
See infra Part V.
92
Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
93
Walker, supra note 16, at 467.
89

2021]

AN ARGUMENT FOR CLAIMING SCÈNES À FAIRE

393

elements—re-contextualized for dramatic or comedic effect. 94 In
this light, a significantly greater aesthetic analysis than the scènes à
faire standard or stock inquiry provides is needed to accurately assess the expressive function of elements within a work. 95
Precision is crucial to a court’s assessment, as the motion picture
and television business continues to rapidly evolve like never before. 96 This evolution has triggered the rapid development of genre
conventions both narratively and aesthetically. For example, with
the proliferation of streaming television services like Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu, critics and journalists alike have contended that the
“streaming series” is a new genre in and of itself due in part to new
narrative conventions, aesthetic possibilities, and output methods.97
On that account, the impossibility of predicting the new genre of
tomorrow does not appear to be losing steam.
In sum, the scènes à faire doctrine assumes that an artistic or
literary genre possesses “discrete, persistent, and readily identifiable
conventions, i.e., devices ‘that flow naturally and necessarily from
the choice of a given concept.’” 98 This assumption, however, does
not track reality. On the contrary, it has been rightly argued that
“genre conventions are unstable social constructs that continually
evolve, arising and disappearing as audience tastes and temperaments change over time.” 99 In other words, determining what conventions were standard at one point in time provides slight
knowledge about the conventions of a different time, even for writings of identical genres. 100 For this reason, courts must evaluate a
work’s originality at the time of creation, as an author’s perception

See id. at 453–54.
See id.
96
Kelsey Sutton, Analysts Explain What This Year’s Seismic TV Changes
Mean for 2021, ADWEEK (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.adweek.com/convergenttv/analysts-explain-what-this-years-seismic-tv-changes-mean-for-2021/.
97
See, e.g., James Poniewozik, Streaming TV Isn’t Just a New Way to Watch.
It’s a New Genre., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/12/20/arts/television/streaming-tv-isnt-just-a-new-way-to-watch-its-anew-genre.html.
98
Walker, supra note 16, at 438 (citing Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v.
Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
99
Id.
100
Id.
94
95
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of genre conventions assuredly evolves alongside a genre’s perpetual transformation. 101
In doing so, a court would reduce the risk of assessing elements
within the work that indeed pre-dated or post-dated what was
“stock” or “standard” at the time of creation. 102 Relatedly, this temporal framework would ensure that any expert testimony would help
educate the judge and potentially a jury as to what was truly common in the industry at that time. Evaluating originality without a
temporal framework would, more notably, overthrow the goal of rewarding an author’s ingenuity. 103 This belief makes intuitive sense:
an infringing work that becomes popular should not be permitted to
use the scènes à faire doctrine as a sword against what was once
original singular expression.
III.

A DISNEY FRANCHISE: THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE SCÈNES À
FAIRE DOCTRINE DEMONSTRATED
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. 104 validates the contention that the lack of a sound temporal framework
may ultimately lead to an inequitable result based on an inapposite
justification for how or why certain elements are scènes à faire. Current and future analytical methods would benefit immensely from
an ex-ante author-drafted supplement that details the complexities
of how a genre’s conventions were used in a work at the time of
creation. 105
A.
A Writer’s Dream Come True
In October 1999, Tova Laiter introduced screenwriters Arthur
Lee Alfred II (“Alfred”) and Ezequiel Martinez, Jr. (“Martinez”) to
Brigham Taylor (“Taylor”), Josh Harmon (“Harmon”), and Michael
Haynes (“Haynes”) at the Walt Disney Company (“Disney”). 106
101
102

2019).

See generally id.
See generally Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (C.D. Cal.

See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12.
See 821 F. App’x 727, 729 (9th Cir. 2020).
105
See infra Part V.B.
106
Appellants’ Corrected Opening Brief at 1, Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., No.
19-55669, 2019 WL 4889768, at *1 (9th Cir. 2020).
103
104
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Thereafter, Alfred and Martinez presented an original screenplay
Red Hood to Taylor, Harmon, and Haynes (together, the “Disney
Creative Team”). 107 While collaborating with the Disney Creative
Team on Red Hood, Alfred and Martinez alleged that they developed a new idea for an original screenplay entitled Pirates of the
Spanish Main. 108 Prior to pitching the film to Disney, Alfred and
Martinez retitled their screenplay Pirates of the Caribbean, which
was the name of a theme park ride at Disneyland. 109 Alfred and Martinez alleged that the title was an “inspired” change because the
“name of the Disney Ride . . . had no story.” 110 The final draft,
which centered on an “original supernatural element of a story about
a rivalry between pirates,” was submitted to Taylor on August 9,
2000. 111
Weeks passed without correspondence from Taylor as to
whether Disney was at all interested in the screenplay. 112 Alfred and
Martinez claimed that during a creative meeting concerning Red
Hood, the Pirates of the Caribbean screenplay was visible in Taylor’s office along with artwork that Alfred and Martinez had provided. 113 According to the two screenwriters, upon mentioning the
screenplay, they “were quickly ushered out of Taylor’s office.”114
After returning to Taylor’s office a “short time later, all materials
that been on the coffee table had been removed and the meeting
ended abruptly.” 115
On November 26, 2002, the Pirates of the Caribbean screenplay
was finally returned to Martinez via U.S.P.S Priority Mail. 116 The
first Pirates of the Caribbean film, Pirates of the Caribbean: The
Curse of the Black Pearl, 117 would go onto premiere some seven

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at *3.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl was released in
3,416 theatres and ultimately grossed US $654,264,015. Pirates of the Caribbean:
107
108
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months later, on July 9, 2003. 118 Upon viewing the blockbuster hit,
it was clear to Alfred, Martinez, and Laiter that there were substantial similarities between their original screenplay and the film. 119
B.
Sunk by the District Court
Alfred, Martinez, and Laiter brought suit against “The Walt Disney Company, et al. in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on November 14, 2017.” 120 The case was then
transferred on September 18, 2018, to the United States District
Court for the Central District of California. 121 Nearly two months
later, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. 122 Thereafter, Judge
Consuelo B. Marshall applied the extrinsic test by assessing the “articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters and sequence of events” in the parties’
works. 123 In so doing, the court noted the well settled precept of copyright law: “[s]cenes-à-faire, or situations and incidents that flow
necessarily or naturally from a basic plot premise, cannot sustain a
finding of infringement.” 124 As detailed below, the court ultimately
found that the works were “not substantially similar as a matter of
law.” 125
First, Judge Marshall concluded that the single claimed similarity as to the plot of the screenplays—“supernatural ‘cursed’ pirates
or ‘skull faced’ pirates”—was scènes à faire. 126 Unfortunately, the
judge did not give any reasoning as to why. However, Disney did
state in their Answering Brief that “‘[s]upernatural pirates’ are
scènes à faire for pirate works (appearing in countless works, from
Richard Wagner’s 1843 opera The Flying Dutchman to William
Hope Hodgson’s 1909 [novel] The Ghost Pirates) and are a key
The Curse of the Black Pearl, BOX OFFICE MOJO, https://www.boxofficemojo.com/release/rl4134045185/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
118
Appellants’ Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 106, at *3.
119
Id. at *3–4.
120
Id. at *7.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
124
Id. at 1181 (citations omitted).
125
See id. at 1190.
126
Id. at 1183.
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element of the Pirates of the Caribbean Ride.” 127 Even so, “a new
treatment of a common subject may be protected by copyright,”128
and while Disney did identify specific works to demonstrate that a
particular element has been previously presented in literature and
theatre, it remains to be seen as to whether that is sufficient for a
finding of generic stock. 129 Moreover, the absence of any analysis
measuring how prevalent these elements are in modern works, along
with the fact that the novel and opera were 109 and 175 years old,130
respectively, leads to a reasonable inference that the court did not
necessarily look to what was truly standard or stock when the Plaintiffs’ screenplay was written.
Next, Judge Marshall assessed the Plaintiffs’ contention that the
works were similar because they both included, “treasure maps,
ghost ships, the ‘undead,’ the supernatural, ships flying black sails,
skeletons, privateers, naval attacks, dark fog, the ‘pirate code,’
ghosts, and sea monsters.” 131 He reasoned that the elements were
unprotectable because they were “familiar stock scenes, and characteristics that flow naturally from the works’ shared basic plot premise” about pirates. 132 In other words, the elements were scènes à
faire. 133 Upon contrasting the main characters in the works, all similarities—ranging from cockiness, bravery, and drunkenness, 134 to
wearing dark pirate clothing and having facial hair 135—were found
by the court to be generic and unprotectable. 136 The similar themes
between the works (mutiny and betrayal and a prologue that occurs
ten years prior to the main story) and the similarities in mood (“dark
scenes involving pirate battles and sea monsters”), along with
Appellees’ Answering Brief at 27, Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., No. 1955669, 2019 WL 749605, at *27 (9th Cir. 2020).
128
Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.
1947) (“Copying and infringement may exist, although the work of the pirate is
so cleverly done that no identity of language can be found in the two works.”).
129
See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 127, at *27.
130
See id.
131
Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1183.
132
Id. at 1183.
133
See generally Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. App’x 727, 729 (9th Cir.
2020).
134
Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1185.
135
Id. at 1186.
136
Id. at 1185.
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similarities in setting (ships, port towns, and the Caribbean generally), were held unprotectable because they all flowed “naturally
from unprotectable basic plot premises” concerning pirates. 137
C.
Set Afloat by the Ninth Circuit
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the screenplay
shared sufficient similarities with the film to survive a motion to
dismiss, as the selection and arrangement of the similarities was
“more than de minimis.” 138 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the district court’s dismissal of the action mainly rested upon the belief that
similar elements were “unprotected generic, pirate-movie
tropes.” 139 For that reason, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusion because
“expert testimony would aid in determining whether
the similarities Plaintiffs identify are qualitatively
significant[,] . . . [which would be] useful in this circumstance, where the works in question are almost
twenty years old[,] and the blockbuster Pirates of the
Caribbean film franchise may itself have shaped
what are now considered pirate-movie tropes.” 140
Despite the recognition that expert testimony would be helpful,
the Ninth Circuit did not expressly clarify what the appropriate temporal framework is or should be for applying the scènes à faire doctrine to screenplays. 141 Courts should evaluate what was standard
and existing when the author wrote the screenplay. As demonstrated
in this Comment, the work’s elements that may have been unique
and inventive in 1999 could in fact be the genre tropes of present
day. 142 If courts applied the scènes à faire doctrine by focusing on
the genre tropes existing at the time of litigation, which it appears
the district court in Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. may have done, the
incentive to create original works will be discouraged. 143 For
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 1187–89.
Alfred, 821 F. App’x at 729.
See id.
See id.
See generally id. at 729.
See supra Part III.B.
See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12.
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instance, if an infringer’s screenplay becomes commercially successful as to define the modern tropes of that genre, a scènes à faire
analysis that assesses the existence of present genre tropes to determine if the original copyrighted screenplay is “common or stock”
produces an illogical “scenario in which the copyrighted work loses
its value by” the infringing work becoming successful and widely
adopted. 144
Similarly, if a copyrighted screenplay becomes widely clichéd
upon its success, a scènes à faire inquiry that evaluates the existence
of current genre tropes to decide if the original copyrighted screenplay is “common or stock” creates an irrational situation whereby
the copyrighted work loses its value by becoming popular and extensively adopted. 145 To what extent should a creator’s copyrighted
work become so popular that the work itself converts to scènes à
faire? 146 Put differently, does it make sense to have a rule that works
can become scènes à faire merely on the basis of their own popularity? 147 Indeed, this perverse scenario would likely stymy the incentives for creating original works. 148
IV.

PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES PRESENT A WORKABLE SOLUTION
TO A NECESSARY BUT FLAWED DOCTRINE
The chief ambition of the American patent system is to encourage innovation, as demonstrated in the Constitution’s articulation of
Congress’s power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive
Right to their . . . Writings and Discoveries.” 149 The patent system
stimulates advancement by “rewarding inventors with a time-limited exclusive patent right for taking two steps they likely would not
otherwise take: to invent in the first instance and to reveal

144
145
146
147
148
149

See id.
See id.
Cendali, supra note 7, at 417.
Id.
See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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information to the public about these inventions, thereby enriching
society with the invention and the ability to build on the invention.” 150
A.
The Specification and Obviousness
As a general matter, modern patents contain both a specification
and a set of claims. 151 The patent’s claims are located at the conclusion of the patent document; this portion sets forth the legal boundaries through articulating “precisely what it is that the inventor
wants to prevent others from making, using, or selling.” 152 The specification is a description in words and illustrations of what the invention is, how it works, what complications it aims to resolve, and
what distinguishes it from what existed previously. 153 The opening
paragraph of section 112 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, provides that the specification “shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the
same . . . .” 154
In the seminal case of Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit provided that “[c]laims define and circumscribe,” whereas “the written
description discloses and teaches.” 155 And so, the specification is
best understood as the part of the patent application that educates in
words and pictures as to what the invention is, and how it differs
from the prior art references. 156 In other words, a commonsense assessment of the written description should indicate whether the inventor is the one responsible for the underlying contribution as the
description should illuminate the invention’s distinguishable
150
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719,
731 (2009).
151
Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
645, 653 (2018).
152
Id. at 653–54.
153
Id. at 653.
154
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2020).
155
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc).
156
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2020).

2021]

AN ARGUMENT FOR CLAIMING SCÈNES À FAIRE

401

features from what society already knew. 157 From the vantage point
of the Federal Circuit, the written description inquiry should confirm
whether “the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”158
The other demand, known as the enablement requirement, necessitates “that the specification teach a skilled artisan how to make and
use the claimed invention.” 159 However, “in practice[,] the enablement and written description requirements are basically coextensive.” 160
Although patentable inventions are frequently difficult or expensive to describe and define clearly, the patent system’s inclusion of
a specification requirement provides inspiration for a possible solution to the failings of the scènes à faire doctrine. 161 A copyright version of the written description requirement could afford a platform
for applicants to explain the essential “objective” elements and features of their invention, i.e., original screenplay or teleplay. 162 This
perspective reveals a better way for copyright registration to function: to allow creators to distinguish and assert fundamental elements for determining scènes à faire at the time of creation.
The appropriateness of anchoring the scènes à faire inquiry to
the date when the copyrighted work was made likewise finds support in the arena of patent law, specifically its obviousness inquiry. 163 In the patent law context, courts resolve the validity of a
claimed invention by “cast[ing] the mind back to the time the invention was made” to determine whether the invention was obvious. 164
To that end, patent law cautiously warns against using the phrase “is
obvious” because it “improperly focuses on the present” and “may
also lead to an improper approach in which the judge determines
whether the invention is presently obvious.” 165 All in all, allowing
creators to characterize and proclaim fundamental elements at the
Sawicki, supra note 151, at 686.
Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1351.
159
Sawicki, supra note 151, at 719.
160
Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1113 (2011).
161
See Fromer, supra note 150, at 755.
162
See id.
163
Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12.
164
In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
165
Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1543 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
157
158
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time of (or in close proximity to) creation would aide courts in determining scènes à faire and, subsequently, substantial similarity by
effectively providing a temporal window to the author’s perceived
originality and genre landscape when the work was made.
****
Before turning to this Comment’s proposed solution, it is useful
to briefly view the different claiming approaches and application requirements of patent and copyright law. Balancing these approaches
against each other illuminates the underpinning principles inspiring
this Comment’s proposal of a “written supplement”—an extra-textual inclusion to be made available at the time of copyright registration.
B.
Claiming Systems of Patent Law and Copyright Law
Copyright law has a procedure of “central claiming by exemplar,” requiring the delivery only of an ideal member of the set of
protected works in tangible form, 166 e.g., a completed screenplay.
Copyright protection then extends past the copyrighted work itself
to substantially similar works—that is, “a set of works to be enumerated only down the road” 167 in the event of infringement litigation. There, the author’s work is used as the prototype against which
all purportedly infringing works are compared to determine “if they
share sufficient salient characteristics to fall within the scope of the
copyright holder’s rights.” 168
Hence, one can view the copyright system as not requiring “formal claims[,]” as the work itself is “protectable immediately upon
fixation.” 169 Consequently, the timing of copyright claiming manifests relatively late, and claims can be tactically fashioned to suit the
contours of certain disputes. 170 Because the characteristics of the
claimants’ work and its precise periphery are not further specified
until, and unless, there is copyright litigation, claiming can be advantageously directed to cover the defendant’s allegedly infringing

Fromer, supra note 150, at 721.
Id.
168
Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 123, 161 (2018).
169
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170
Id. at 169.
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works. 171 Unlike patent law registrations, copyright applications are
not deeply assessed, nor do they contain any critical information
about the claimed aspects of the copyrighted work. 172 Rather, the
registrations for copyright are comprised largely of “administrative
data like information about the registrant, the work’s title, its completion date, and publication date (if any).” 173 For the majority of
works generated after 1977, the copyright endures for the author’s
lifetime plus seventy years, 174 whereas the life of a patent generally
spans a twenty-year term. 175
Patent law has often embraced a system of peripheral claiming
in which patentees must thoroughly articulate their invention’s outer
bounds, typically by providing its “necessary and sufficient characteristics.” 176 In addition to peripheral claiming, patent law has also
embraced central claiming approaches. 177 There, the scope of the
patent is measured by “the contribution the inventor made to the
art.” 178 In a central claiming patent analysis, the specification’s comprehensive explanation of what the inventor did, rather than merely
“the language used in the claims at the end of the patent,” forms the
basis and focus of the patentable subject matter inquiry. 179
In the context of this Comment’s proposed written supplement,
patent law’s central claiming dogma lays a functional groundwork
for the proposal’s utility because “it demands a case-by-case analysis of the proximity between the inventor’s contribution and some
object of inquiry.” 180 Contribution, in this sense, relates to the principle that in a central claiming patent analysis, the specification’s
inclusive description necessitates that parties identify the more germane characteristics in an exemplar. 181 In this light, the potential
form and substance of “central claiming by exemplar” in copyright
law is more akin to peripheral claiming, whereby claims can be
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
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written with greater ambiguity to make them broader and strategically overinclusive. 182 And so, the proposal strives—in part—to
provide a copyright claiming methodology, which upon implementation would diminish the opportunity for “strategic behavior that
can lead to a free-for-all in copyright claiming.” 183
V.
DECONSTRUCTING A SCREENPLAY OR TELEPLAY
Some commentators have sought a “bookshelf rule” 184 as a
scènes à faire remedy that requires a court to establish a work’s
genre and consider its conventions after reviewing a modified copyright registration, whereby “claimants also provide bibliographic
information that identifies comparable works already in the collection of the Library of Congress.” 185 Nevertheless, notwithstanding
the scènes à faire doctrine’s limitations, this would be a misstep, as
it fails to utilize what most authors possess to write a screenplay or
teleplay: a comprehensive, detailed compilation of not only title references, but also images, notes, designs, and descriptions regarding
their work and the many elements comprising it. 186 That is not to
say that the sole inclusion of an author’s inspirational title references
would not aid a court’s assessment of scènes à faire. However, without more concrete specificity regarding the various expressive elements of a screenplay, a court’s search for substantial similarity may
still fall victim to an overly broad classification or misguided conception of an author’s work.
A.
A Work’s Development: The Writer’s Reality
The ease of completing a thorough disclosure that teaches one
about the tangible work is anything but onerous for serious applicants. Therefore, the copyright registration procedure ought to adopt
182
See Sawicki, supra note 151, at 685 (“[A shift to] central claiming
can . . . be understood as a . . . preemptive response to potential overinclusiveness.”).
183
Fromer & McKenna, supra note 168, at 162.
184
Walker, supra note 16, at 468.
185
Id.
186
See, e.g., Jason Hellerman, How Do Professional Screenwriters Outline
Their Projects?, NO FILM SCHOOL (May 8, 2020), https://nofilmschool.com/professional-outline.
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a requirement inspired by the objectives underpinning patent law’s
specification requirement. 187 Under the current copyright system,
artists and writers are forced to “define” and “describe” their works
upon litigation commencing. 188 Such defining or describing manifests through the creator asserting crucial elements for determining
substantial similarity or defining “the heart of the work for ascertaining fair use.” 189 This suggests that a writer’s ability to demarcate
their creations, while not necessarily an activity approached without
reluctance, is possible.
Of course, many who believe their screenplay has been stolen
are in fact “victims of synchronicity, not plagiarism,” 190 and the coincidence of any screenplay’s element is exacerbated when the similarity is seen in finished form on the big screen or television set.
Thus, a concern lies in an author’s ex post characterizations as a debated work’s artistic and commercial effect on the world may be
unscrupulously incorporated into the work’s depiction in litigation. 191 Because litigation always commences sometime after the
work’s creation, regardless of the creator’s intent, the effect of a
work onto the marketplace may change what is alleged as protected
expression or not. 192 Given the task’s complexity and potential for
hindsight bias,193 examination of a copyright claim in this fashion
does not adequately assess copyright validity, that is, the actual originality of the claim itself may be skewed. Rather, administrative ex
ante mechanisms should be in place to aide courts in determining
scènes à faire and ultimately substantial similarity.
What some commentators have overlooked, especially in the
context of screenplays and teleplays, is that authors: (1) must virtually always utilize a “pitch deck” or “lookbook” when attempting to
sell a feature film screenplay or raise finances to make a feature

See supra Part IV.
Fromer, supra note 150, at 790.
189
Id.
190
Gladden, supra note 9, at 383.
191
Fromer, supra note 150, at 790.
192
Id.
193
See Liz McKenzie, Comment, Drawing Lines: Addressing Cognitive Bias
in Art Appropriation Cases, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 85 (2013).
187
188
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film, 194 and (2) must more than likely have a “series bible” to sell
and market a pilot television script. 195 A film “pitch deck” allows
authors to share two narratives to a potential financier or production
company. 196 On the one hand, it presents the characters and story of
the film, while, on the other hand, it allows the author to detail their
inspiration and overriding vision.197 There, a film’s author frequently will provide comparable film projects—both creatively and
budgetarily. 198 In addition, the “pitch deck” will habitually include
the exact genre of the screenplay. 199 This defining of genre is crucial; for instance, if the film is described as within the horror genre,
potential financiers would likely want to assess if the script invokes
feelings of fear, dread, and terror. 200 Beyond this, the visual elements included aim to express the spirit and essence of the film—it
is here that the genre’s aesthetic convention may also be ascertained. 201 Within the realm of fiction publishing, a budding author
will commonly provide publishers with a query letter to hopefully
catch an editor’s attention. 202 The content of a query letter is not
materially dissimilar to the substance of a film’s pitch deck, except
for the fact that a query letter is not accompanied by tonal imagery. 203
In the context of television (i.e., teleplays), a “series bible” will
typically include a series logline, the genre of the show, comparable
See Meredith Alloway, On Decks: The Art (and Necessity) of the Independent Film Lookbook, FILMMAKER MAG. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://filmmakermagazine.com/107189-on-deck/#.X_SUrmRKgUY.
195
See Valerie Kalfrin, How to Create the Perfect Show Bible, SCREENCRAFT
(May 8, 2017), https://screencraft.org/2017/05/08/create-perfect-show-bible/.
196
See Nick Sadler, What is a Pitch Deck and Why Should You Create One?,
SCRIPT MAG. (Jul. 18, 2018), https://scriptmag.com/features/what-is-a-pitchdeck-and-why-should-you-create-one.
197
Id.
198
See Adam Blakemore, Perfect Pitch: What a Pitch Can Do for Your Indie
Film Project, RAINDANCE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.raindance.org/perfectpitch-what-a-pitch-deck-can-do-for-your-indie-film-project/.
199
See id.
200
See generally id.
201
See id.
202
See How to Pitch Your Book to an Agent: Step-by-Step Guide,
MASTERCLASS, https://www.masterclass.com/articles/how-to-pitch-your-bookto-an-agent#what-to-include-in-the-pitch (last updated Aug. 9, 2021).
203
See id.
194
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show references, detailed character biographies for all main characters, and episodic summaries for the entire first season. 204 Often, a
thorough series bible will provide summaries for future seasons,
along with an explanation of how the show will conclude. 205 Other
elements regarding pacing, themes, and visual style or mood will be
set out in the document. 206 Essentially anything established on
screen will likely have been reflected in the series bible in some
way. 207
B.
The Written Supplement
Just as the Supreme Court in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought
review of a patent’s specification as a way to inform the meaning of
a claim and subsequent invention, here too, a written supplement
offered at the time of registration will afford a court valuable insight
into the circumstances surrounding a work’s formation at the time
of creation. 208 As mentioned, 209 a court’s application of an extrinsic
analysis to determine substantial similarity among the parties’ works
typically assesses “the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace,
characters, and sequence of events,” and, therefore, a court may preclude scènes à faire elements at all said junctures. 210 Since many
authors have established these different guiding facets of a given
work—more than likely prior to copyright registration and certainly
prior to litigation—these elements weigh heavily in the construction
of the individual segments of the proposed written supplement.211
Accordingly, the written supplement submission for literary and
dramatic works, namely screenplays, teleplays, novels, and theatrical plays, should include six basic categories: (1) Genre; (2) Plot;
See generally Ken Miyamoto, 21 Series Bibles That Every TV Screenwriter
Should Read, SCREENCRAFT (Aug. 12, 2019), https://screencraft.org/2019/08/
12/21-series-bibles-that-every-tv-screenwriter-should-read/.
205
See id.
206
See id.
207
See id.
208
See generally Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
209
See supra Section II.A.
210
See, e.g., Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (C.D. Cal.
2019).
211
See, e.g., SYD FIELD, THE SCREENWRITER’S WORKBOOK 1–25 (2006);
MARC BLAKE & SARA BAILEY, WRITING THE HORROR MOVIE 181–88 (2013).
204
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(3) Character; (4) Theme; (5) Setting; and (6) Mood and Pace. Although literary works differ from works of the performing arts (i.e.,
screenplays, teleplays, and theatrical plays) in that they are solely
intended to be read, these categories are inherently a part of these
mediums of expression. 212
While there may be apprehension about the cost and viability of
the administrative and legal support necessary to institute such an
inclusion, this proposal does not seek to implement an ex ante examination of copyright claims. Instead, this proposal will provide
vital guidance to a court regarding a copyright’s validity, only
should there be later litigation regarding copyright infringement.
This result is beneficial, in large part, because the supplementary
materials would indeed reflect the artistic view of the author’s originality at the time of creation. 213 Although it is certainly imaginable
that film studios would work with lawyers to create a robust written
supplement, it is also plausible that a capable writer could successfully complete a supplement without the assistance of a legal team.
As a result, completing the proposed supplement would not always
be a costly endeavor, and therefore, the supplement would not deter
creation. Nonetheless, the specification inspired disclosure would
demand that the author’s inclusion be in “full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art” 214 to which
the creation pertains to garner understanding and appreciation of the
author’s envisioned work. This ask finds an analog in patent law’s
enablement requirement because effective “series bibles” and “pitch
decks” are given to collaborators to help in producing and making
the product with the creator. 215
In the end, the problem of copyright seeker overreaching would
largely be diminished in light of the supplement demonstrating the
writer’s perception of the work’s many elements at the approximate
time of registration. 216 To reduce the potential that the written supplement was dishonestly created to advantageously support a party’s
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2020).
214
35 U.S.C. § 112.
215
See Kalfrin, supra note 195.
216
See generally Fromer, supra note 150, at 790 (“As litigation typically happens some time after the work’s creation, the work’s artistic effect on the world
can be incorporated into the work’s depiction in litigation.”).
212
213
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interests, this proposal contends that the supplement should be submitted at the time of registration. This proposal leaves open a future
scenario where a copyright infringement action could proceed between a new work (accompanied by the written supplement) and an
older work (not accompanied by the written supplement). Under this
scenario, a court should still strive to employ a scènes à faire analysis that assesses if the disputed work was original or whether it was
standard or stock when the author created the work. 217
Although some writers may renounce this supplement out of fear
of having their “magic recipe” known, it should be stressed that this
supplement would not only be discovered as a means to support litigation but would also serve to provide effective notice to the public
of a set of protected embodiments or rights. In any event, such an
overbearing want for secrecy is arguably misplaced. One only needs
to turn their attention to Quentin Tarantino’s words during the release of his debut film Reservoir Dogs. 218 In describing his inspiration, Tarantino stated, “I didn’t go out of my way to do a rip-off of
‘The Killing,’ but I did think of it as my ‘Killing,’ my take on that
kind of heist movie.” 219 He furthered divulged, “Although it’s not
exactly ‘Rashomon,’ you do get a sense of the characters’ different
perspectives when they talk about what happened.” 220
1. GENRE
As demonstrated, some writers craft genre-bending pieces that
may leave courts unable to properly classify a work into an applicable genre. 221 At a minimum, this inclusion will allow an author’s
conception of their work and the genre or genres in which it falls
under to be precisely matched. 222 Rather than relying solely on
See supra Part III.C.
John Hartl, ‘Dogs’ Gets Walkouts and Raves, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 29,
1992), https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19921029&slug=1521437.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
See supra Section Part II.B.
222
But see Walker, supra note 16, at 466–67 n.201 (“[A]n author’s understanding of the genre of their work may not be in sync with either popular or
expert notions of what the work’s genre actually is. For instance, while an author
may believe that they wrote a horror story, the readers of that work may instead
consider it to be a comedy. However, the risk of an author misclassifying their
217
218
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courts to determine the conventions within a certain genre, and then
ascertain which of these conventions are shared with the work, 223
this section of the supplement will seek the author’s exacting genre
classification, along with specific genre reference titles and inspirational films. Furthermore, this segment will afford the author an opportunity to provide a thorough understanding of whether a subversive or expressive treatment of genre tropes or stock elements have
been built into the work.
Like patent law’s specification requirement, whereby an inventor distinguishes their invention from what existed previously,224
this segment of the inclusion empowers authors to distinguish their
new writing from particular genre titles. This offers authors a way
to characterize what elements are in fact scènes à faire. Some may
fear that this approach may result in an underinclusive depiction;
however, the innate connection between all of the supplement’s elements would make it difficult to mislead without misstep. 225 Nevertheless, taken together, these inclusions would bring greater clarity as to what genre conventions and elements, if any, were intended
and utilized in the work at the time of creation.
2. PLOT
Defined as “the plan of events in a screenplay,” plot is equivalently understood as the cause-and-effect relationship amongst
events in a screenplay. 226 It is this unique arrangement of events that
aggregates to expression. 227 With greater frequency than any other
noted element, a screenplay’s plot initiates the bulk of copyright infringement actions. 228 Analogous to the other elements of a screenplay, sufficiently demonstrating “substantial similarity in plot
hinges upon the idea/expression dichotomy.” 229 The extrinsic test
work is likely to be less harmful overall than leaving the classification undetermined until litigation arises.”).
223
Id. at 467.
224
See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (“The specification must set forth the precise
invention for which a patent is solicited, in such manner as to distinguish it from
other inventions and from what is old.”).
225
See infra Part V.B.4.
226
See Gladden, supra note 9, at 373.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
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centers “not [on] the basic plot ideas for stories,” which are not
shielded by copyright law, but on “the actual concrete elements that
make up the total sequence of events and the relationships between
the major characters.” 230 Thus, a court may define plot as a sequence
of events by which an author expresses their ideas and theme.231
This means that even scenes that are not distinctive or well-defined
can be rendered substantially similar if they advance in a similar
fashion or pattern within the two screenplays. 232 That said, the pattern may be found to be unprotectable scènes à faire if it is not sufficiently tangible or “concrete.” 233
When a writer “plots,” he or she partakes in the art of creating
relationships between scenes, juxtaposing them to make the story
points more potent and momentous. 234 In so doing, a writer turns the
story’s structural considerations that concern conflict and meaning
into (hopefully) dynamic moments that “convey exposition, build
suspense, reveal character[,] and expose emotion” to strengthen the
audience’s immersion in the world of the story. 235 Often, the type of
dramatic question presented by a screenplay dictates the plot and
informs what kind of story it will be. 236 To that end, many have held
that a definite number of plot ideas exist—some set that number at
seven, 237 others at twenty-nine. 238 Because it is impossible to predict
how plot issues may manifest in an infringement action, the most
reasonable demand is that writers attempt to render their stories into
one of the known tenets of plot ideas. 239 In that event, a court will
be more faithfully guided in its assessment of whether “incidents,
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985).
Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d. Cir. 1938).
232
Gladden, supra note 9, at 375.
233
Id.
234
Linda Cowgill, The Art of Plotting Your Story & Screenplay Structure,
MOVIE OUTLINE, http://www.movieoutline.com/articles/the-art-of-plotting-yourstory-and-screenplay-structure.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2021).
235
Id.
236
How To Write Story Plot: Tips, Tricks, and Margaret Atwood’s Writing
Prompts, MASTERCLASS, https://www.masterclass.com/articles/everything-youneed-to-know-about-writing-plot#7-types-of-plots (last updated Nov. 8, 2020).
237
See id.
238
See Gladden, supra note 9, at 360 (citing RON SUPPA, THE BUSINESS OF
SCREENWRITING 66 (1999)).
239
How To Write Story Plot: Tips, Tricks, and Margaret Atwood’s Writing
Prompts, supra note 236.
230
231
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characters[,] and settings” are, as a “practical matter[,] indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment” of that plot idea. 240 Moreover, this understanding will especially aide courts when wrestling
with a screenplay whose plot and genre pairing is arguably atypical;
for instance, coming-of-age horror films, e.g., Carrie. 241
3. CHARACTER
Although there is not a specific test for comparing and contrasting two characters, a very useful way to assess two characters is
by scrutinizing character background, personal attributes, and motivation. 242 A well-rounded supplement would consider all three of
these elements for its main character(s). 243 This element overlaps
with the element of plot as a character’s background and specific
motivation informs where a character “has been and where he [or
she] is trying to go.” 244 The less specific, transcendent, and dynamic
a character is, the greater the chance that that character or characteristics will be found to be unprotectable scènes à faire. 245 That said,
differences in the traits and personalities of the major characters operating in a substantially similar plot may be enough for the infringer
to escape liability. 246
4. THEME
Although there is some intersection between plot, theme, and
mood, each is a distinct and inimitable element of expression that
merits individual analysis. 247 Still, this masks a deeper complexity,
which demonstrates its utility within the written supplement: theme
is a great tool to separate similar plots from one other. 248 That is, it
is extremely doubtful that two screenplays are going to have “substantially similar plots, yet maintain substantially different
240

1997).

Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222, 1227 (C.D. Cal.

See CARRIE (Red Bank Films 1976).
Gladden, supra note 9, at 372.
243
See id.; Herzog v. Castle Rock Ent., 193 F.3d 1241, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999)
(utilizing all three elements in analyzing similarity amongst characters).
244
See Gladden, supra note 9, at 373.
245
See generally id. at 384.
246
Id. at 377.
247
Id. at 380.
248
Id.
241
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themes.” 249 As a general proposition, if the two themes are indeed
substantially different, the plot similarities are likely “not concrete”
and consist only of the same common or generic ideas, i.e., scènes
à faire. 250
Even so, a concern may arise as to whether the described theme
and its characteristics could capture the work’s artistic essence. 251
One thing that might ameliorate this concern is that a director, in the
course of preparing a film for festival release and subsequent distribution, often will provide a director’s statement to the public. 252 The
director’s statement is a written description in which the director explains the themes, vision, and inspiration for the film. 253 For example, when it was announced that Jim Jarmusch’s film Only Lovers
Left Alive would be presented in competition at the Cannes Film
Festival, this director’s statement was released:
Only Lovers Left Alive is an unconventional love
story between a man and a woman, Adam and Eve.
(My script was partially inspired by the last book
published by Mark Twain: The Diaries of Adam and
Eve—though no direct reference to the book is made
other than the character’s names.)
These two lovers are archetypal outsiders, classic bohemians, extremely intelligent and sophisticated—
yet still in full possession of their animal instincts.
They have traveled the world and experienced many
remarkable things, always inhabiting the shadowed
margins of society. And, like their own love story,
their particular perspective on human history spans
centuries—because they happen to be vampires.

249

Id.
See id.
251
See Fromer, supra note 150, at 790.
252
See, e.g., Kevin Jagernauth, “It Is A Mad Time To Be Alive”: Darren Aronofsky’s ‘Mother!’ Director’s Statement’s Plus New Images, THE PLAYLIST
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://theplaylist.net/mother-directors-statement-20170829/.
253
See Elena Alston, The Director’s Statement: What to Write, INT’L MOVING
IMAGE SOC’Y, (July 28, 2017), https://www.societyinmotion.com/2017/07/directors-statement/.
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But this is not your usual vampire story. Set in the
very distinct cities of Detroit and Tangier, and taking
place almost entirely at night, Adam and Eve must
have human blood to survive. But they now live in
the world of the 21st century where biting the neck
of a stranger would be reckless and regressive—for
survival, they must be certain the blood that sustains
them is pure and free of disease or contamination.
And, almost like shadows, they have learned long
ago to deftly avoid the attention of any authorities.
For our film, the vampire is a resonant metaphor––a
way to frame the deeper intentions of the story. This
is a love story, but also the story of two exceptional
outsiders who, given their unusual circumstances,
have a vast overview of human and natural history,
including stunning achievements and tragic and brutal failures. Adam and Eve are themselves metaphors
for the present state of human life––they are fragile
and endangered, susceptible to natural forces, and to
the shortsighted behavior of those in power. 254
While only some films brave the festival circuit, the established
practice of drafting a director’s statement demonstrates that a scriptwriter could indeed write, as Jarmusch’s statement reflects, an informative supplement for theme (and plot) that is both succinct and
effective. 255 In fact, it is wholly plausible that a supplement for
theme may be explored through plot and vice versa. If that be the
case, each section would disclose an identical written description.
5. SETTING
By itself, a physical geographic setting will not typically be a
protectable element of expression. 256 Still, differences in geographic
SONY PICTURES CLASSICS, ONLY LOVERS LEFT ALIVE PRESS KIT (2013),
available at https://www.sonyclassics.com/onlyloversleftalive/onlyloversleft
alive_presskit.pdf.
255
See id.
256
See Sinicola v. Warner Bros., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1176, 1189 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (concluding that New York City as a setting was not an element of protectable expression).
254
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setting between two scripts may themselves speak to larger differences in plot and theme or may inform a court’s application of the
scènes à faire doctrine, as the settings may naturally flow from a
common theme or, conversely, the theme may naturally derive from
a certain setting. 257 Clearly, most script thieves have “enough common sense” 258 to change the geographic setting within a work. Even
so, the setting category still has significant utility because it warrants
an author to describe how setting is used within the work. 259 For
example, a “small town” may be used to serve a comedic function
or a “big town” may help to spotlight a fish-out-of-water story
line. 260 Therefore, the use of setting may illuminate a larger pattern
of infringement or the existence of scènes à faire. 261 Understanding
how setting is being used will assist courts in analyzing “setting in
terms of where specific scenes [physically] occur in a screenplay.” 262 Plaintiffs frequently provide a “laundry list of setting common to both scripts (i.e., both scripts have scenes that take place in
restaurants, theatres, bars, etc.).” 263 Therefore, the “setting” segment
of the supplement may equally benefit an alleged infringer seeking
to disprove substantial similarity. If the physical location of these
“common scene settings” serves no particular function, without similarity of dialogue or plot within those locales, a court will likely
dismiss the settings as generic or scènes à faire and thus, unprotectable. 264
6. MOOD AND PACE
A screenplay’s mood may often dictate the pace, which will help
a court comprehend how a genre convention is being used in its application of the scènes à faire doctrine. 265 For example, a more
thoughtful and reflective mood may give way to a slower paced film,
indicating that the script is a character-driven drama, whereas a
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265

See Gladden, supra note 9, at 380.
Id.

See id.

See id. at 380–81.
See id. at 381.
Id. at 281.
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See generally id.
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tension-filled rapidly paced film likely demonstrates that the screenplay is a thriller. 266 While the mood of a screenplay is swayed by
plot and theme, it does stand individually in a court’s analysis as its
own concrete element of expression—“a combination of the tone
and feel of the work.” 267 Unprotectable similarities in mood may be
found when these resemblances are common to a given genre. 268 At
the same time, if a plaintiff is unable to demonstrate substantial similarity in plot, substantial similarity as to character, theme, and mood
may adequately demonstrate infringement. 269 Notably, the element
may prove most useful for a plaintiff if they do not succumb to dismissal or summary judgment, as “it is ultimately going to fall to a
jury to determine if the total concept and feel of the two works are
the same.” 270
VI.
CONCLUSION
At its best, the scènes à faire doctrine ensures that necessary
scenes or situations and stock elements or plots remain unprotectable. Yet, at its worst, the scènes à faire doctrine is an expansive and
subjectively applied bar to protection that may spell disaster for creative works that feature original expression. My proposal is not a
remedy that cures all that upsets copyright law’s objective; however,
a humane compromise is suitable here to balance the competing interests of authors and the active goals of copyright. If a written supplement is to be based in part on section 112 of the Patent Act, it
should be centered on patent law’s requirement that the “specification shall contain a written description of the invention.” 271
To best inform the supplement’s guidelines, the proposal’s disclosure considers both a court’s substantial similarity analysis and
what information an author likely possesses about their own
266

Id.
Id. at 377.
268
See, e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir.
1988) (concluding that similarities in terms of mood were common to the genre
of action-adventure television series and movies and therefore did not demonstrate substantial similarity).
269
See Gladden, supra note 9, at 380.
270
Id. at 384.
271
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work. 272 The purpose and applicability of such adequate disclosure
is as simple as it is beneficial. Satisfaction of the written supplement
ensures that a tangible fixed work at the time of registration is sufficiently disclosed, so that the elements of protectable expression are
more distinctly and accurately established by a reviewing court if
litigation ever commences. 273 An adequate description of the tangible fixed work guards against author overreaching by insisting that
the work be recounted in detail at the time of registration as to transcend the four corners of the work. 274 Thus, an author’s future claims
and conduct can potentially be shaped by what was truly encompassed within his original creation. The fear that an author would
intentionally categorize or substantiate their work to carve out more
protective rights is largely displaced due to the demonstrated interplay of elements. 275 Assuredly, any chicanery by a claimant would
be readily discerned because the elements and the tangible work itself serve as a rational check on what was additionally provided in
the supplement.
Legendary film director Robert Altman previously said, “I don’t
think screenplay writing is the same as writing—I mean, I think it’s
blueprinting.” 276 Indeed, screenplays and teleplays are “literary
blueprints” on which feature narrative films and television shows
are based. 277 Dissimilar to the novel, where detailed prose fills the
page and the express direct exploration of theme is possible, screenplays and teleplays are written with cinematic and visual description
to further a story. 278 For this reason alone, the very nature of screenwriting necessitates deep consideration of a supplementary proposal
to aide courts in determining and understanding similarities from
See supra Section V.A.
Cf. Walker, supra note 16, at 467.
274
See generally Fromer, supra note 150, at 790.
275
See supra Section V.B.
276
Quote of the Day: Robert Altman, LA SCREENWRITER, https://www.lascreenwriter.com/2011/07/15/quote-of-the-day-robert-altman/ (last visited Oct. 8,
2021).
277
See Ken Miyamoto, 7 Signs That You’re Overwriting Your Screenplay,
SCREENCRAFT (Dec. 12, 2019), https://screencraft.org/2019/12/12/7-signs-thatyoure-overwriting-your-screenplay/.
278
Writing a Screenplay vs. Writing a Novel: Learn the 4 Key Differences,
MASTERCLASS, https://www.masterclass.com/articles/writing-a-screenplay-vswriting-a-novel (last updated Aug. 27, 2021).
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what may be absent or pared-down on the page. 279 Although a registration supplement asking authors to specify extra-textual descriptions and inspirations of new works would be unprecedented as a
timely procedural mechanism, courts have utilized artists’ statements as evidence in copyright infringement suits, often in fair use
matters. 280 Accordingly, the change would not only be reasonable,
but it would also serve to promote a more thorough and confident
review of scènes à faire elements. 281
For now, writers should register their screenplays with the Writers Guild of America and with the U.S. Copyright Office. 282 Writers
should likewise keep detailed accounts of when and to whom they
have submitted their written works. 283 Because the “line between
inspiration and unlawful copying is remarkably thin,” 284 writers
should also strive to make their works as distinct as possible. 285 As
a result, the work will become harder for an infringer to misappropriate. 286
In the end, copyright registration must empower courts to venture further in their infringement analyses. Until then, courts will
continue to be enabled to function as vague identifiers of similarities, potentially masking originality under the guise of the scènes à
faire doctrine. 287 And so, it is time to continue the dialogue on how
to delicately reform copyright for the modern day—for what is
standard tomorrow, may not have been today. 288
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